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Vulnerability Analysis of the Optimized Link State
Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2)
Thomas Clausen, Ulrich Herberg
Abstract—Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) are leaving the
confines of research laboratories, to find place in real-world deploy-
ments. Outside specialized domains (military, vehicular, etc.), city-
wide community-networks are emerging, connecting regular Internet
users with each other, and with the Internet, via MANETs. Growing to
encompass more than a handful of “trusted participants”, the question
of preserving the MANET network connectivity, even when faced
with careless or malicious participants, arises, and must be addressed.
A first step towards protecting a MANET is to analyze the
vulnerabilities of the routing protocol, managing the connectivity. By
understanding how the algorithms of the routing protocol operate, and
how these can be exploited by those with ill intent, countermeasures
can be developed, readying MANETs for wider deployment and use.
This paper takes an abstract look at the algorithms that constitute
the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), and
identifies for each protocol element the possible vulnerabilities and
attacks – in a certain way, provides a “cookbook” for how to best
attack an operational OLSRv2 network, or for how to proceed with
developing protective countermeasures against these attacks.
Keywords—OLSRv2, MANET, Vulnerability Analysis, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
OLSRv2 (the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol ver-
sion 2) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] is a successor to the widely
deployed OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs (Mobile Ad
hoc NETworks). OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as
its predecessor, however offers various improvements, e.g. a
modular and flexible architecture allowing extensions, such as
for security, to be developed as add-ons to the basic protocol.
The developments reflected in OLSRv2 have been motivated
by increased real-world deployment experiences, e.g. from
networks such as FunkFeuer [7], and the requirements pre-
sented for continued successful operation of these networks.
With participation in such networks increasing (the FunkFeuer
community network has, e.g., roughly 400 individual partici-
pants), operating with the assumption, that participants can be
“trusted” to behave in a non-destructive way, is utopia. Taking
the Internet as an example, as participation in the network
increases and becomes more diverse, more efforts are required
to preserve the integrity and operation of the network. Most
SMTP-servers were, e.g., initially available for use by all and
sundry on the Internet – with an increased populace on the
Internet, the recommended practice is to require authentication
and accounting for users of such SMTP servers [8].
A first step towards hardening against attacks disrupting the
connectivity of a network, is to understand the vulnerabilities
of routing protocol, managing the connectivity. This paper
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therefore analyzes OLSRv2, to understand its inherent vulnera-
bilities and resiliences. The authors do not claim completeness
of the analysis, but hope that the identified attacks as presented
form a meaningful starting-point for OLSRv2 security.
A. OLSRv2 Overview
OLSRv2 contains three basic processes: Neighborhood Dis-
covery, MPR Flooding and Link State Advertisements.
1) Neighborhood Discovery: The process, whereby each
router discovers the routers which are in direct communication
range of itself (1-hop neighbors), and detects with which
of these it can establish bi-directional communication. Each
router sends HELLOs, listing the identifiers of all the routers
from which it has recently received a HELLO, as well as the
“status” of the link (heard, verified bi-directional). A router a
receiving a HELLO from a neighbor b in which b indicates to
have recently received a HELLO from a considers the link a-b
to be bi-directional. As b lists identifiers of all its neighbors in
its HELLO, a learns the “neighbors of its neighbors” (2-hop
neighbors) through this process. HELLOs are sent periodically,
however certain events may trigger non-periodic HELLOs.
2) MPR Flooding: The process whereby each router is
able to, efficiently, conduct network-wide broadcasts. Each
router designates, from among its bi-directional neighbors,
a subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the
router and relayed by the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop
neighbors. MPR selection is encoded in outgoing HELLOs.
The set of routers having selected a given router as MPR is the
MPR-selector-set of that router. A study of the MPR flooding
algorithm can be found in [9].
3) Link State Advertisement: The process whereby routers
are determining which link state information to advertise
through the network. Each router must advertise links between
itself and its MPR-selector-set, in order to allow all routers
to calculate shortest paths. Such ink state advertisements are
carried in TC messages, are broadcast through the network
using the MPR Flooding process. As a router selects MPRs
only from among bi-directional neighbors, links advertised in
TC are also bi-directional. TC messages are sent periodically,
however certain events may trigger non-periodic TCs.
B. Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy
Proper functioning of OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router
can acquire and maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting
the effective network topology; and (ii) that the network
converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have suffi-
ciently identical topology maps. An OLSRv2 network can be
disrupted by breaking either of these assumptions, specifically
(a) routers may be prevented from acquiring a topology map
of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topology map, which
does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or
more routers may acquire inconsistent topology maps.
C. OLSRv2 Attack Vectors
Besides “radio jamming”, attacks on OLSRv2 consist of
a malicious router injecting “correctly looking, but invalid,
control traffic” (TCs, HELLOs) into the network. A malicious
router can either (a) lie about itself (its ID, its willingness to
serve as MPR), henceforth Identity Spoofing or (b) lie about
its relationship to other routers (pretend existence of links to
other routers), henceforth Link Spoofing. Such attacks will in-
fine cause disruption in the Link State Advertisement process,
through targeting the MPR Flooding mechanism, or by causing
incorrect link state information to be included in TCs, causing
routers to have incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent topology
maps. In a different class of attacks, a malicious router injects
control traffic, tuned to cause an in-router resource exhaustion,
e.g. by causing the algorithms calculating routing tables or
MPR sets to be invoked continuously, preventing the internal
state of the router from converging.
D. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: sec-
tion II, III, and IV each represents a class of disruptive
attacks against OLSRv2, detailing a number of attacks in each
class. Section V summarizes the identified vulnerabilities in
an OLSRv2 network, and section VI summarizes the ways
OLSRv2 has inherent resilience to. The paper is concluded in
section VII.
II. TOPOLOGY MAP ACQUISITION
Topology Map Acquisition relates to the ability for a – any
– given router in the network to acquire a representation of the
network connectivity. A router, unable to acquire a topology
map, is incapable of calculating routing paths and participating
in forwarding data. Topology map acquisition can be hindered
by (a) TC messages to not being delivered to (all) routers in the
network, such as what happens in case of Flooding Disruption,
or (b) in case of “jamming” of the communication channel.
A. Flooding Disruption
MPR selection (section I-A2) uses information about a
router’s 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood, assuming that (i) this
information is accurate, and (ii) all 1-hop neighbors are equally
apt as MPR. Thus, a malicious router will seek to manipulate
the 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information in a router such
as to cause the MPR selection to fail.
1) Flooding Disruption due to Identity Spoofing: In fig-
ure 1, a malicious router X spoofs the identity of b. The
link between X and c is correctly detected and listed in
X’s HELLOs. a will receive HELLOs indicating a links,
respectively b:{ b-e }, X:{ X-c, X-e }, and d:{ d-e, d-c }.
For a, X and d are equal candidates for MPR selection.
e
b
cd
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spoofs b
Fig. 1. Identity Spoofing: The malicious router spoofs address of router b.
If b and X (i) accept MPR selection and (ii) forward
flooded traffic as-if they were both b, identity spoofing by X
is harmless. If X does not forward flooded traffic (i.e. does not
accept MPR selection), its presence entails flooding disruption:
selecting b over d renders c unreachable by flooded traffic.
cb
d
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Fig. 2. Identity Spoofing: flooding attack: 2-hop address duplication.
In figure 2, X (gray) spoofs the identity of x (white), i.e.
a and c both receive HELLOs from a router identifying as x.
For b, a and c present the same neighbor sets, and are equal
candidates for MPR selection. If b selects only a as MPR,
c will not relay flooded traffic from or transiting via b, and
the (white) router x (and routers to the “right” of it) will not
receive flooded traffic.
2) Flooding Disruption due to Link Spoofing: In the net-
work in figure 3, the malicious router X spoofs links to the
existing router c, as well as to a fictitious w. a receives
HELLOs from X and b, reporting X:{X-c, X-w}, b:{b-c}. All
else being equal, X appears a better choice as MPR than b, as
X appears to cover all neighbors of b, plus w.
b Xa
c
w
cd
s
Fig. 3. Link Spoofing: Flooding Disruption
As a will not select b as MPR, b will not relay flooded
messages received from a. The routers left of b (starting
with c) will, thus, not receive any flooded messages from or
transiting a (e.g. a message originating from s).
B. Radio Jamming
Radio Jamming is an attack, in which access to the com-
munication channel between routers is hindered by, e.g.,
a powerful transmitter is generating “white noise” on the
channel. Due to the ease of access to the channel, this is
particularly possible in wireless networks. Jamming affects
reception, thus interfaces on a “jammed” channel are unable
to receive HELLO and TCs. Depending on lower layers, this
may not affect transmissions: HELLOs and TCs from a router
with “jammed” interfaces may be received by other routers. As
the Neighborhood Discovery process of OLSRv2 identifies and
uses only bi-directional links for the Link State Advertisement
process, a link from a jammed router to a non-jammed router
would not be considered, and the jammed router appear simply
as “disconnected” for the un-jammed part of the network –
which is able to maintain accurate topology maps.
III. EFFECTIVE TOPOLOGY
Link-state protocols assume that each router can acquire
an accurate topology map, reflecting the effective network
topology. This implies that the routing protocol, through
its message exchange, identifies a path from a source to a
destination, and this path is valid for forwarding data traffic.
A. Incorrect Forwarding
In OLSRv2, routers send TCs and HELLOs using link-local
transmissions; the routing process in each router retransmits
received messages, destined for network-wide diffusion. If the
router is not configured to enable forwarding, this will not
affect acquisition of a topology map by the routing protocol
– but will cause a discrepancy between the effective topology
and the topology map.
B. Wormholes
A wormhole, depicted in the example in figure 4, may be
established between two collaborating devices, connected by
an out-of-band channel; these devices send traffic through
the “tunnel” to their alter-ego, which “replays” the traffic.
Thus, router d and router s appear as-if direct neighbors and
reachable from each other in 1 hop through the tunnel, with
the path through the MANET being 100 hops long.
s d
100 hop long path
1 hop long path via "wormhole"
Fig. 4. Wormholing between two collaborating devices not participating in
the routing protocol, “tunneling” traffic between s and d over an “out-of-band”
channel.
The impact of a wormhole depends on its detailed behavior.
If the wormhole relays control traffic, but not data traffic, the
considerations in section III-A applies. If it relays control and
data traffic alike, it is identical to a usable link: the routing
protocol will generate a topology map reflecting this as the
effective network topology. The efficiency of the topology
so obtained depends on (i) the wormhole characteristics, (ii)
how the wormhole presents itself and (iii) how paths are
calculated. If the cost of the wormhole “link” represents
the actual cost of transit, then the wormhole may in the
worst case cause no degradation in performance, in the best
case improve performance by offering a better path. If the
wormhole “misrepresents” the cost of transit, then the presence
of the wormhole results in a degradation in performance as
compared to using the non-wormhole path. Conversely, if the
“link” presented by the wormhole has better characteristics,
the wormhole results in improved performance.
An additional consideration with regards to wormholes is,
that it may be undesirable to have data traffic transit such a
path: an attacker could, by introducing a wormhole, acquire
the ability to record and inspect transiting data traffic.
C. Sequence Number Attacks
OLSRv2 uses two different sequence numbers in TCs, to (i)
avoid processing and forwarding the same message more than
once (Message Sequence Number), and (ii) to ensure that old
information, arriving late due to e.g. long paths other delays,
is not allowed to overwrite fresher information (Advertised
Neighbor Sequence Number – ANSN).
For (i), an attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing
the identity of another router in the network, and transmitting
a large number of TCs, each with different Message Sequence
Numbers. Subsequent TCs with the same sequence numbers,
originating from the router whose identity was spoofed, would
thence be ignored, until eventually information concerning
these “spoofed” TC messages expires.
For (ii), an attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing
the identity of another router in the network, and transmitting
a single TC, with an ANSN significantly larger than that which
was last used by the legitimate router. Routers will retain
this larger ANSN as “the most fresh information” and discard
subsequent TCs with lower sequence numbers as being “old”.
D. Message Timing Attacks
In OLSRv2, each control message may contain “validity
time” and “interval time” fields, identifying the time for which
information in that control message should be considered valid
until discarded, and the time until the next control message of
the same type should be expected [3].
1) Interval Time Attack: A use of the expected interval
between two successive HELLO messages is for determining
the link quality in Neighbor Discovery process, as described
in [6]: if messages are not received with the expected intervals
(e.g. a certain fraction of messages are missing), then this
may be used to exclude a link from being considered as
useful, even if (some) bi-directional communication has been
verified. If a malicious router X spoofs the identity of an
existing router a, and sends HELLOs indicating a very low
interval time, a router b receiving this HELLO will expect the
following HELLO to arrive within the interval time indicated
– or otherwise, decrease the link quality for the link a-b. Thus,
X may cause b’s estimate of the link quality for the link a-b to
fall below the limit, where it is no longer considered as useful
and, thus, not used.
2) Validity Time Attack: A malicious router, X, can spoof
the identity of a router a and send a HELLO using a very low
validity time (e.g. 1 ms). A receiving router b will discard the
information upon expiration of that interval, i.e. a link between
router a and b will be “torn down” by X.
E. Indirect Jamming
Indirect Jamming is when a malicious router X by its actions
causes legitimate routers to generate inordinate amounts of
control traffic. This increases channel occupation, and the
overhead in each receiving router processing this control
traffic. With this traffic originating from legitimate routers, the
malicious device may remain undetected to the wider network.
1) Indirect Jamming: Neighborhood Discovery: Figure 5
illustrates indirect jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery
process. A malicious router X advertises a symmetric spoofed
link to the non-existing router b (at time t0). a selects X as
MPR upon reception of the HELLO, and will trigger a HELLO
at t1. Overhearing this triggered HELLO, the attacker sends
another HELLO at t2, advertising the link to b as lost, which
leads to router a deselecting the attacker as MPR, and another
triggered message at t3. The cycle may be repeated, alternating
advertising the link X-b as LOST and SYM.
a
X
t0
Indicate b 
as SYM
X
t1
MPRs: (X)
a a
X
t2
Indicate b
as LOST
X
t3
MPRs: ()
a
b b
Fig. 5. Indirect Jamming in Neighborhood Discovery
Indirect Jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery process
will cause additional MPR set calculations; are “triggered
HELLOs” enabled, an increased HELLO frequency occurs.
2) Indirect Jamming: Link State Advertisement: Similar
to III-E1, figure 6 illustrates indirect jamming of the Link
State Advertisement process. A malicious router X may “flip”
between selecting a as MPR, and between advertising the
link a-X as lost. This leads a to update its set of advertised
neighbors (as the MPR Selector Set of a changes), increase
the corresponding ANSN, and advertise this in a subsequent
TC – which X uses to trigger another “status flip”.
Each such TC with an updated ANSN causes all routers in
the network to recalculate their routing tables; are “triggered
TCs” enabled, an increased TC frequency occurs.
a
X
t0
Select as 
MPR
X
t1
TC: (X-a)
       ANSN
a
ANS={X}
ANSN++
a
X
t2
Indicate as
LOST
X
t3
TC: ()
       ANSN
a
ANS={}
ANSN++
Fig. 6. Indirect Jamming in Link State Advertisement
IV. INCONSISTENT TOPOLOGY
Inconsistent topology maps can occur by a malicious router
employing either of identity spoofing or link spoofing for
conducting an attack against an OLSRv2 network.
A. Identity spoofing
Identity spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via
the Neighborhood Discovery process and via the Link State
Advertisement process; either of which causing inconsistent
topology maps in routers in the network.
1) Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Dis-
covery: In order to minimize the risk of detection, the mali-
cious router (gray circle) in figure 7 elects to not participate
in the Link State Advertisement procedure, thus it does not
select any MPRs and does not accept being elected as MPR
(by advertising a willingness of zero). By not participating in
the Link State Advertisement process, its presence is known
only to c, d and e. X elects to spoof the identity of a, b, f
and g, i.e. routers whose identity it spoofs will not receive
control messages, and thus not allowing them to detect that
these identities are also advertised elsewhere in the network.
Traffic transiting d, from either side, to destination a, b, f and
g will, rather than being forwarded to the intended destination,
be delivered to the malicious router. Traffic transiting c with
b as destination, will be delivered to the intended b. Traffic
transiting c with a as destination may be delivered to the
intended a via b or to the malicious router via d – as the
paths are of equal length.
a b dc e f g
X
spoofs: a, b, f, g
Fig. 7. Identity Spoofing: maximizing disruptive impact while minimizing
risk of detection.
In figure 7, c is the only router receiving control traffic
indicating two topologic locations of the identities a, b.
However this is not an unusual situation: a valid link might
indeed exist between routers a and d as well as between routers
b and d, e.g. through another channel. This creates a situation
wherein two or more routers have inconsistent topology maps:
traffic for an identified destination is, depending on where in
the network it appears, delivered to different routers.
2) Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertise-
ments: An inconsistent topology map may also occur when
the malicious router takes part in the Link State Advertisement
process: spoofing an identity and selecting MPRs causes a
link to the spoofed identities of the malicious router to be
advertised through the network.
c Xfb eda
spoofs a
Fig. 8. Identity Spoofing due to Link State Advertisements
In figure 8, the malicious router X spoofs the address of
a. If X selects f as MPR, all routers in the network will be
informed about the link f-a by way the TCs originating from
f. Assuming that (the real) a selects b as MPR, the link b-a
will also be advertised through the network.
b and c will calculate paths to a via b. e and f will calculate
paths to a via f – i.e. through the malicious router X. e and f
are thus disconnected from the real a. d will have the choice
of selecting a path in to a in either direction.
In general, the following observations can be made: (i) the
network will be split in two, with those routers closer to b
than to X reaching a, and those routers closer to X than to b
will be unable to reach a; (ii) routers beyond b, i.e. routers
beyond one hop away from a will be unable to detect this
identity spoofing.
The impact of combining identity spoofing with Link State
Advertisements is greater than the impact of section IV-A1, as
it causes alterations to the topology maps of all routers in the
network. The attack is also easier to detect: with the malicious
router advertised through the network, routers whose identities
spoofed can detect this. When a receives a TC message from
f advertising the link f-a, it can deduce that “something is
wrong” as a does not have f recorded as a direct neighbor.
B. Link Spoofing
Link spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via
the Neighborhood Discovery process and via the Link State
Advertisement process; either of which causing inconsistent
topology maps in routers in the network.
1) Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Dis-
covery: The malicious router X in figure 3 spoofs two links
to c and w. Consequently, a selects X as its sole MPR – and
therefore router X is the sole router expected to advertise links
to a. s selects a as MPR, thus a is expected to advertise the link
a-S through the network, i.e. using the MPR flooding process.
The topology maps acquired by the various routers in this
example are:
• a and b: accurate topology map due to the Neighborhood
Discovery process providing topological information up
to 2 hops away.
• c: as in figure 9(a). Link state advertisements from a are
not forwarded by b. Existence of s and the link a-s is not
known beyond b. Existence of a and the link b-a and is
known to b through the Neighborhood Discovery process.
• d and beyond: as illustrated in figure 9(b).
• s: accurate Topology Map corresponding to the network
in figure 3. This may contain the dotted routers c and
w, only if X participates in the Link State Advertisement
process (section IV-B2).
b acd
(a) Inconsistent Topology Map in
router c.
bcd
(b) Inconsistent Topology
Map in routers d and beyond.
Fig. 9. Perceived Topology Maps with malicious router X performing Link
Spoofing in the Neighborhood Discovery Process.
2) Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertise-
ments: The malicious router X in figure 10 spoofs links to the
existing a, by participating in the Link State Advertisement
process and including the link X-a in its advertisements.
c Xf ab ed ga
Fig. 10. Link Spoofing: The malicious router X advertises a spoofed link
to router a in its TC messages, thus all routers will record the links X-a and
b-a.
As TC messages are flooded through the network, all routers
will receive and record information describing the link X-a. If
a has selected b as MPR, a will likewise flood this link state
information through the network, and all routers will receive
and record information describing a link b-a.
Routers b, c and d will calculate a shortest path via a
different router than routers f and g, thus leading to network
split in two. This is similar to the impact of section IV-A2,
and when a receives a TC message from X advertising the
link X-a, it can likewise deduce that “something is wrong” as
a does not have X recorded as a direct neighbor.
V. VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
Table I summarizes the vulnerabilities in OLSRv2, as pre-
sented in this paper. For each, a note indicates if OLSRv2
provides some inherent resilience; further discussion of the
resilience of OLSRv2 is given in section VI.
Attack Section OLSRv2 Resilience?
Topology Map Acquisition
Flooding disruption II-A None
Radio Jamming II-B Partly: Considers only bidirectional
links
Effective Topology
Incorrect Forwarding III-A None
Wormholes III-B none
Sequence Numbers III-C Partly: rejecting “old” messages
Message Timing III-D None
Indirect Jamming III-E Yes: minimum and maximum intervals
Inconsistent Topology
Identity Spoofing IV-A None
Link Spoofing IV-B None
TABLE I
VULNERABILITY SUMMARY OF OLSRV2
VI. INHERENT OLSRV2 RESILIENCE
While OLSRv2 does not specifically include security fea-
tures (such as encryption), it has some inherent resilience
against part of the attacks described in this paper. In particular,
it provides the following resilience:
• Sequence numbers: OLSRv2 employs message sequence
numbers, specific per router identity and message
type. Routers keep an “information freshness” number
(ANSN), incremented each time the content of a Link
State Advertisement from a router changes. This allows
rejecting “old” information and duplicate messages, and
provides some protection against “message replay”. This
also presents an attack vector (section III-C).
• Ignoring uni-directional links: The Neighborhood Dis-
covery process detects and admits only bi-directional
links for use in MPR selection and Link State Ad-
vertisement. Jamming attacks (section II-B) may affect
only reception of control traffic, however OLSRv2 will
correctly recognize, and ignore, such a link as not bi-
directional.
• Message interval bounds: The frequency of control mes-
sages, with minimum intervals imposed for HELLO and
TCs. This may limit the impact from an indirect jamming
attack (section III-E).
• Additional reasons for rejecting control messages: The
OLSRv2 specification includes a list of reasons, for
which an incoming control message should be rejected
as malformed – and allows that a protocol extension
may recognize additional reasons for OLSRv2 to con-
sider a message malformed. This allows – together with
the flexible message format [2] – addition of security
mechanisms, such as digital signatures, while remaining
compliant with the OLSRv2 standard specification.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a detailed analysis of security
threats to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2
(OLSRv2), by taking an abstract look at the algorithms and
message exchanges that constitute the protocol, and for each
protocol element identifying the possible vulnerabilities and
how these can be exploited. In particular, as link-state protocol,
OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router can acquire and maintain
a topology map, accurately reflecting the effective network
topology; and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that all
routers in the network will have sufficiently identical (consis-
tent) topology maps. An OLSRv2 network can be effectively
disrupted by breaking either of these assumptions, specifically
(a) routers may be prevented from acquiring a topology map
of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topology map, which
does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or
more routers may acquire substantially inconsistent topology
maps.
The disruptive attacks to OLSRv2, presented in this paper,
are classified in either of these categories. For each, it is
demonstrated, whether OLSRv2 has an inherent protection
against the attack.
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